To put it simply and rather crudely, Washington’s efforts at colonialism and empire-building in the 21st century amounted to a rather cheap and farcical imitation of what the British did during their colonial and imperial reign as the world’s largest colonial and imperial power. And in the very end, the ‘Collective West’ not only failed in achieving the aims and goals which it had publicly stated during the course of its colonial and imperial efforts and pursuits, but the aims and goals were in a constant state of flux the entire time, which in turn led to confusion and chaos on a grand scale, and quite frankly, some of us were carried away by the confusion and chaos until we stepped back and figured out what was really going on.
As a result of the failure of the ‘Collective West’ over the course of the last couple of centuries in not only achieving its aims and goals but also in determining its collective aims and goals as they related to their colonial and imperial efforts and pursuits, every individual Western nation now has to keep its own house in order so that they can recover somewhat from the confusion and chaos resulting from what amounts to a collective failure over the course of the last few decades in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Ukraine sheds plenty of light on the frenzy and scramble to keep one’s own house in order and to retain one’s own scarce resources. England and Poland, for instance, have admitted that giving their own military equipment and resources to Ukraine would mean that they would be left without any of their own. The squabbles over giving tanks to Ukraine between the United States and Germany also shows the limits to what the ‘Collective West’ can achieve in Ukraine.
After Afghanistan and the Middle East, it is perhaps expected that a “containment” strategy of a Cold War nature would be difficult for the United States to keep up. As part of a “containment” strategy, the United States has to match Russian military and psychological pressure at certain strategic geopolitical ‘pivot points.’ One of these strategic geopolitical pivot points is Ukraine, and it is quite telling that the ‘Collective West’ is unable to pour into Ukraine the resources and the support which was given to Korea, for instance, during the 20th century Cold War or to Afghanistan during the 20th century Cold War as part of a ‘containment’ strategy. This demonstrates that the 21st century containment strategy does not wield the same level of efficacy and potency as it did during the 20th century when the United States was at the peak of its power given the results and outcomes of Afghanistan and the Middle East.
Beneath both the publicly stated aims and goals and the constant change and flux of the aims and goals of the last few decades – even though many would refuse to admit it – is the search for something unconscious or subconscious. The search goes on, and if the search continues, it will have to be facilitated with limitations and restrictions on the adventurism and ‘Flights of Fancy’ and aimless wars which failed with immense cost to uncover and reveal what it actually is that we are searching and yearning for, given the geopolitical and social context which we find ourselves in at the moment.