A Sphere of Deference

Brzezinski also highlighted an interesting contradiction which exists within the Chinese system, which is that the political system demands China be isolated in terms of the norms and rules of the prevailing international order, whereas its economic system demands openness to the world. Brzezinski contended that there is “no viable alternative to China’s continued openness to the world.” And in terms of this contradiction within the overall Chinese system between the character and nature of the economic system on one hand and the character and nature of the political system on the other hand, Brzezinski wrote:

“Democratization will thus increasingly haunt China. Neither that issue nor the related question of human rights can be evaded for too long. China’s future progress, as well as its emergence as a major power, will thus depend to a large degree on how skillfully the ruling Chinese elite handles the two related problems of power succession from the present generation of rulers to a younger team and of coping with the growing tension between the country’s economic and political systems.”

But democratization and openness to the West have in large part been eclipsed and overtaken by Chinese nationalism and militarism under Xi Jinping. It seems as though those within the upper echelons of the Chinese political system who advocate democratization and openness in the Western sense have either been purged or are prone to get purged under Xi Jinping. Disappearances of certain political figures, including the defense minister after his handshake with his American counterpart in Singapore recently, all indicate that Xi Jinping is shaping China into his own image, and the image of Xi Jinping consists first and foremost of a China that is assertive and defiant in the face of Western pressure and politicking. 

After all, it will take a certain level of assertiveness and defiance in the face of the West in order for China to achieve its first and foremost strategic goal, namely, to re-establish China’s place as the regional hegemon in Asia after centuries of aberration from the norm due to Western intervention and interference in the region. China’s goal of becoming the regional hegemon in Asia “is bound to continue galvanizing Chinese nationalism while souring American-Chinese relations.” 

It follows that: “A Chinese sphere of regional influence is thus in the making.” Brzezinski added: “In brief, a Chinese sphere of influence – perhaps a sphere of deference would be a more accurate formulation – can be defined as one in which the very first question asked in the various capitals regarding any given issue is ‘What is Beijing’s view on this?’” 

By virtue of all of this, basic and core American and Chinese interests will fail to align, and it is only natural that there would be friction and a souring of relations between America and China which in turn could lead to war between both sides. To borrow from Brzezinski:

“China’s principal objection to America relates less to what America actually does than to what America currently is and where it is. America is seen by China as the world’s current hegemon, whose very presence in the region, based on its dominant position in Japan, works to contain China’s influence. In the words of a Chinese analyst employed in the research arm of the Chinese Foreign Ministry: ‘The U.S. strategic aim is to seek hegemony in the whole world and it cannot tolerate the appearance of any big power on the European and Asian continents that will constitute a threat to its leading position.’ Hence, simply by being what it is and where it is, America becomes China’s unintentional adversary rather than its natural ally.” 

By virtue of all of this, it will become almost impossible for America to convince China that America’s core aims and goals vis-à-vis China are not to humiliate China and not to contain and thwart China’s external aspirations and goals, which means both sides are inevitably on a war path as things stand. Moreover, counteracting and thwarting American global hegemony on the part of China automatically translates into the goal of establishing a new regional and global order for China that is Sinocentric rather than Eurocentric. Also, this goal of fostering a Sinocentric regional and global order that repudiates American global hegemony brings Russia and China into a very close alliance, given that this goal of repudiating American global hegemony is shared by both Russia and China and is one of the most important common interests between Russia and China. It is also possible that China expects the dilution of American global power and influence to sway America towards becoming a partner of China rather than an adversary, as Brzezinski suggested. Whether this Chinese expectation translates into reality remains to be seen. But the reality is that American global hegemony cannot last forever, and as a result, there is the belief on the part of the Chinese that America has no choice but to eventually turn to China as a partner. However, all is in flux and is uncertain at the moment.