Fuqiang

One should note that the flux and the uncertainty in terms of the U.S.-China relationship stems in large part from the Chinese side, not the American side, in the sense that the American side is in a defensive and reactive mode in East Asia, whereas the Chinese are in an offensive mode and are proactive in the pursuit of their goals and interests. In fact, it does not even matter what the American side does at this point. What the American side does is a non-issue. The flux and the uncertainty come from what China does, given that American forces in China’s vicinity are essentially sitting ducks as a result of China’s rise. Ultimately, it is about Xi Jinping and his decision-making processes and how he assesses the overall situation and in turn how he reacts to the overall situation. It is all quite volatile and uncertain as a result. The whole Chinese labyrinth and system does not even matter for the most part, given that it all comes down to what one man thinks and decides. A man, one should note, who is taking China towards a more nationalistic and militaristic stance as opposed to a more liberal and diplomatic stance. 

Moreover, correcting the “national humiliation” which China endured at the hands of Western powers for the last couple of centuries is enough of a driver and motivator for China to essentially turn the tables on the West as it has recently. And in a sense, that is what it is all about for China, namely, to correct the humiliation which China endured at the hands of Western powers for the last couple of centuries. And when the tables have turned as a result of the overall balance of power in East Asia, America cannot do anything about China’s strategic moves except to react and to appease China in order to avoid war. It is almost certain that America, at this point in time, seeks to avoid war with China in East Asia. 

For the Chinese, the national humiliation at the hands of Western powers is “the starting point of their agonizing voyage into modernity, but also the beginning of the country’s long and painful road back to wealth and power.” The Chinese had to overcome the onset of “backwardness and impotence” and traverse the long and hard journey towards modernity and wealth as a result of this national humiliation. As two Sinologists added:

“It may seem strange to Westerners, accustomed to the histories of modern nations beginning with moments of triumph – the Glorious Revolution in Britain, the storming of the Bastille in France, or the signing of the American Declaration of Independence – to find Chinese beginning their modern journey by highlighting the shock of unexpected defeat and a moment symbolizing greatness lost. Yet that defeat, that moment of loss, resentment, and humiliation, would end up becoming a strangely affirmative one. Being overwhelmed by a materially stronger but culturally inferior foreign power – what Chinese leaders pejoratively referred to as yi, ‘barbarians,’ became a counterintuitive source of motivation for China’s regeneration as a great power. Humiliation was to become transmuted into a positive force – transformed from a depressant into a stimulant – in the construction of a new and modern national identity.”

They added: “The shameful sense of living in paradise lost, of having fallen so far behind other countries, would become a curious badge of distinction, one that would goad the country to strengthen and develop in order to finally catch up with the West and thus once again be able to defend itself and restore China to honor.” And the basic formula behind the acquisition of wealth and power (fuqiang) for the Chinese was a simple one, namely, to borrow Western methods of economic development while remaining Chinese at the core.