Disputed Territory

Empowerment has also put China into a position where it can play games with its key adversaries in the East Asia region, namely, America and Japan. But these games can also lead to miscalculation on the part of one side or the other, and as a result, the miscalculations can increase the risk of an actual war. Of course, the United States will avoid war with China at all costs. But there is also the possibility of America being dragged into a Sino-Japanese conflict, as some writers have suggested. As mentioned before, China seeks to achieve two basic aims or goals with its newfound power. For one, China wants to force the Americans who are along China’s vicinity to move out of the way. And second, China seeks to exact retribution and revenge against Japan. Would America really risk itself over the defense of Japan? Moreover, when the Taliban told the United States to move out of the way and make peace, the Americans obliged. Thus, if China puts enough pressure on the United States to move out of the way and make peace, will the United States oblige? 

American security guarantees for Afghanistan were not “rock solid.” Nor are American security guarantees for Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia rock solid either. If America could not defend Afghanistan against a militia force, then how is it expected to defend three huge regions of the world against the advances and intrigues of a set of natural regional hegemons all at once? Moreover, it is the shift in the balance of power in these regions of the world which renders American security commitments and guarantees as moot. The conflicts and the risks of war in these regions of the world will only escalate rather than diminish, despite American security commitments and guarantees. It is a logical contradiction and flaw for the United States to assume that it can maintain security commitments and guarantees while avoiding conflict and war at the same time. 

Moreover, whenever a rising power like China challenges the established status quo power, what accompanies the challenges is violence on a massive scale and scope. As a result, America will have to either avoid the violence or engage in it, given the most basic and essential issue at hand, namely, the rise of China and the challenge which China poses to the status quo of international affairs. And rather than being optimistic and hopeful that the prospects of war will diminish in a situation like the one we face today in terms of China’s rise and challenge to the status quo of international affairs, the more rational and reasonable approach is to be pessimistic and skeptical about the prospects that conflict and war can be avoided. Taiwan, let alone Japan or South Korea, could be the trigger for a broader conflict in East Asia. But will the United States risk fighting China over Taiwan, or even South Korea and Japan and the Philippines? It appears as though the answer is no. The United States will not risk fighting China if China takes the risk of achieving its strategic aims and goals in the region. And of course, the cardinal aim and goal for China in East Asia is to re-establish China as the regional hegemon in East Asia. All of this, one should note, comes at a time when China is ramping up military expenditures, whereas the United States is being forced to slow down on its military expenditures as a result of skyrocketing debt. 

In short, the Western Pacific region is now “disputed territory.” The military gap between the United States and China is also narrowing. One should note that China having surpassed the United States in terms of naval capabilities is enough to suggest that China will become too formidable of a challenge for the United States in East Asia. Yet the basic aims and goals of both China and the United States remain the same, in the sense that China seeks regional hegemony, whereas the United States still attempts to be the hegemon “all over the world.” But the balance of power makes it likelier for China to achieve its basic aim and goal of regional hegemony, while making it all the more difficult for the United States to achieve its basic aim and goal of global hegemony.