Yellow Peril

But is international society really happy about a “Greater China” coming to fruition? Or to pose the question differently, is the West as the focal point and center of gravity of international affairs for the last few centuries happy about the rise of an alternate pole in the international system which is fundamentally challenging and undermining the status quo of international affairs? As Huntington rightly highlighted, the optimism of a rising Asia on the part of some does not translate into a rosy picture in terms of geopolitics and the reality of international affairs. He wrote:

“This optimism was based on the highly dubious assumption that commercial interchange is invariably a force for peace. Such, however, is not the case. Economic growth creates political instability within countries and regions. Economic exchange brings people into contact; it does not bring them into agreement. Historically it has often produced a deeper awareness of the differences between peoples and stimulated mutual fears. Trade between countries produces conflict as well as profit. If past experience holds, the Asia of economic sunshine will generate an Asia of political shadows, an Asia of instability and conflict.” 

For one, a rising China in economic terms leads to a rise in China in military terms. Second, China’s rise as a military power intensifies the conflict that China will have with America and Japan in East Asia. And third, China’s influence will only grow with greater economic and military power, and with greater influence comes a greater ability to reassert hegemony over East Asia, which then forces East Asian nations to either accommodate China’s rise or join America and Japan in attempting to “contain” China. But what is lost on some of the advocates of “containment” is that “containment” will inevitably lead to war, as was the case with Russia and how Russia ended up starting a war in Ukraine as a result of this policy of “containment.”

Also, East Asia – unlike Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East – is a highly educated and technologically advanced and militarily sophisticated part of the world. Thus, America’s commitment and guarantee of getting in the middle of East Asian conflicts is perhaps doubtful and moot to say the least. One should also note that Sinophobia is actually what is at the heart of U.S-China relations, and Sinophobia is not enough of a driver and motivator for the United States to interject itself into what are essentially Asian conflicts and Asian issues. 

Also, Sinophobia will only lead to more antagonism between China and the United States in the future. Sinophobia is what determines and shapes both domestic and foreign policy in the United States at the moment. In turn, Sinophobia can lead to only two perceivable results or outcomes in the China-U.S. relationship, namely, isolation from China or war with China. Sinophobia, the removal of a major common interest between China and the United States after the ending of the 20^th century Cold War, and the shift in the overall balance of power in East Asia as a result of China’s economic and military rise are the three main factors behind the souring of relations between China and the United States, as Huntington highlighted. 

In a word, culture. There is a clash of cultures which is at the heart of the broader clash between China and the United States. Simply put, China’s rise as an economic and military power affirms China’s belief of its cultural superiority over the West, and in turn, the West takes issue with this belief. From this lack of mutual understanding and this divergence and rift in terms of basic beliefs and convictions, a major conflict can arise between the two sides, as Huntington contended. And to conclude with what was the epitome and summation of Huntington’s argument and thesis: “The sources of conflict are in fundamental differences in society and culture.”