In turn, the change or the shift in the global balance of power between Russia and the United States has led to an unexpected rise in tensions between the two sides. For instance, the war in Ukraine – as opposed to watering down and transitioning to an end or a resolution – has only escalated in recent days and weeks. Moscow openly supports Hamas and Hezbollah and Syria and Iran. And in Afghanistan, the Russians were fully and thoroughly involved in the Taliban’s war against the United States for twenty years. It is also not hard to believe that Beijing and Pyongyang take marching orders from Moscow as well.
Also, power equilibrium in terms of atomic and nuclear weapons compensates for any other material deficiencies that Moscow may have in terms of its “Tale of the Tape” with Washington. Moreover, Moscow sees its conflict with Washington as pertaining to the outcome of world history above all else, to borrow from Kissinger. Moscow sees world history as a process with an inevitable outcome. And that inevitable outcome of world history will be favorable to Moscow, not Washington, according to Moscow’s view. Nor does Moscow believe that military superiority depends on technological superiority. Afghanistan is case in point.
In a word, psychology. Moscow sees its “Cold War” or its conflict with Washington as largely psychological. To borrow from Kissinger:
“It is remarkable that, at a time when most military thinking in the United States was centered around the notion that a new war would start with a surprise attack, such a course was explicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed ridiculed by it. At a period when the prevalent doctrine in the United States was concerned with an all-out war decided ultimately by the attrition of industrial potential, the Soviets never tired of emphasizing the virtue of the indirect approach and of the break-through at the enemy’s weakest link. And the break-through could be achieved by psychological as well as military means. The same terminology was employed interchangeably for both political and military warfare.”
It is perhaps certain that Moscow has identified the “weakest link” in Washington’s alliance system, and in turn, Moscow will exploit that weakest link in order to gain something from Washington in the near future. There is and always has been a sort of “consistency” and “persistence” to Russian behavior and strategy, despite its esoteric and uncommon character and nature. It follows that “the consistency of Soviet behavior would indicate that on questions of doctrine the Kremlin generally does mean what it says.” When Moscow flies over England or Belgium and threatens to bomb London and Brussels, we then have no choice but to take it seriously. The West’s colonial past and the “resentment against their colonial past causes many of the newly independent states to be almost desperately ready to believe the best of the Soviet Union and the worst of the West; an appeal which asked of them nothing more than to agree to the importance of peace and the horror of nuclear warfare was nearly irresistible.”
Hence, virtually every American president is now “compromised” or “handicapped” or “hamstrung” by Russian “atomic blackmail” and psychological warfare, given that: “The task of psychological warfare is to hamstring the opponent through his own preconceptions, and this has been precisely the Soviet strategy with respect to nuclear weapons.” It is almost certain that the use of nuclear weapons is a no-go for the United States in its broader conflict with Russia, and it is a no-go as a result of both Western preconceptions of nuclear weapons and the military and psychological dimensions of the war with Russia itself. Russia is also a nuclear power. In fact, Russia is the world’s largest nuclear power. Russians have a knack or a talent when it comes to shifting the focus away from their own aggression and towards nuclear weapons, as Kissinger highlighted. This knack or talent then prevents the West from using nuclear weapons. Russian “atomic blackmail” consists of “the threat of its growing nuclear arsenal and an appeal to the West’s moral inhibitions.” Kissinger added: “In either case the consequence is a lowered will to resist.” It follows that the United States has very little will or willpower to resist the Soviet or Russian strategy.
Hence, the belief or the conviction in Moscow that “its will to victory is greater than that of its declared victims.” Moreover, when Moscow turns its weaknesses vis-à-vis Washington into its strengths, then the will to resist the strategy on the part of Washington is diminished even further. And if “total war” between Moscow and Washington is to be borne out of their limited wars, Moscow is certain that the outcome of the total war will be in their favor, not in Washington’s favor. In terms of doctrine, philosophy, risk management, and strategy, Moscow sees itself as having the upper hand over Washington. What remains up in the air on both sides is policy, not the aforementioned elements or factors. Also, our perception of limited wars – something which is inevitable between Washington and Moscow from now on – has changed in recent times. Nevertheless, Moscow “has been able to blackmail the West both with its strength and its weakness.” To conclude with Kissinger: “We recoil before Soviet power but we also fear to exploit Soviet difficulties.”
Adam A. Azim 