But where does the liberal order fit into universal consciousness? This is perhaps the root question behind what we are dealing with or what we are trying to tackle conceptually and intellectually and philosophically and perhaps even ethically and practically and morally in terms of not only major power conflict at the moment, but also the basic Cold War context or order of international affairs as a whole which has defined our basic social reality for decades now. The liberal order is in essence a counterweight or a counterbalance against universal consciousness. There are “antithetical concepts of world order” at play when we juxtapose the liberal order on one hand with the operations and workings of universal consciousness which is largely Eastern on the other hand. To borrow from Henry Kissinger:
“Soviet leaders saw East-West relations as a contest between antithetical concepts of world order. They had taken a ‘traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity’ and grafted onto it a revolutionary doctrine of global sweep. The Kremlin would interpret every aspect of international affairs in light of Soviet doctrine about a battle for advantage between what Stalin had called the ‘two centers of world significance,’ capitalism and Communism, whose global contest was inevitable and could end with only one winner. They thought the battle was inevitable, and thus made it so.”
The only way for the liberal order to survive and sustain itself over the long run is through counterpressure against the East, given that at the heart of East-West relations is the balance of power. And historically and traditionally, the balance of power belongs to the East. As Kissinger noted: “East-West diplomacy would more or less automatically reflect the balance of power.” As a result, Washington took it upon itself after World War II to suspend the “national interest” in order to preserve a geopolitical balance between Western Europe and the East. Suspending the national interest for the sake of maintaining an around-the-clock geopolitical balance and “containment” strategy against the East also means suspending democracy at home, given that it requires some sort of bureaucratic despotism or autocracy to maintain a geopolitical balance against the Eastern world at all times.
In theory, keeping up counterpressure around the clock against the East in order to maintain a geopolitical balance may seem dandy and swell. The idea may have appeal to some Westerners, given that it is the balance of power which is at the heart of East-West relations. But in practice and in reality, it is an entirely different story and ballgame. Counterpressure around the clock against the East is not only counterproductive, but counterpressure without an Eastern response is on its own self-destructive for the West, as Chomsky said. Imagine if the Western counterpressure actually led to an Eastern response? Imagine how destructive it would be then for the West.
Nevertheless, Washington was hellbent on disavowing the national interest soon after World War II in order to “contain” what it viewed as Soviet or Russian global expansion. And the main reason for why Washington was hellbent on disavowing the national interest to “contain” Soviet or Russian expansion is because Washington conceived its policy of containment through a moral prism and in turn viewed it as a moral responsibility to contain Soviet or Russian expansion. Only Westerners are saints, and everyone else is a barbarian and morally depraved savage based on this kind of logic and rationale. Both seek expansion. But one is justified in doing so, while the other is a barbarian for doing so. To borrow from Kissinger: “This call to universal responsibility underpinned the decisive American commitment to restoring a devastated postwar world holding the line against Soviet expansion. Yet when it came to fighting ‘hot’ wars on the periphery of the Communist world, it proved a less certain guide.”
Hence, and as mentioned before, the idea or the theory of containment may have appeal to the Western mind. But in practice, it is an entirely different story and ballgame.
Adam A. Azim 