If the basic frame or theme of international affairs is the clash between Western hegemony on one hand and Eastern expansion on the other hand, it follows that everyone and everywhere is an ideological, geopolitical, and military battleground, including Europe. But Europe also demonstrates the limits of American hegemony. For instance, America instructs Europe to place sanctions on the purchase of Russian energy. What Europe does, then, is gets Russia to sell the energy to India, and then Europe buys the Russian energy from India instead of buying the Russian energy from Russia directly. Hence, sanctions as an instrument of American hegemony are futile in the very end.
Morgenthau argued that American foreign policy is driven in large part by the active maintenance of a balance of power in Europe between itself and in particular Russia. The entire purpose of American foreign policy outside of maintaining control over the Western Hemisphere is to maintain a balance of power in Europe so that no European power – with Russia being the biggest of the European powers – can extend over and beyond Europe to encroach into the Western Hemisphere and then threaten America directly and in its own security zone. Since the “Monroe Doctrine” of the 19thcentury, the Western Hemisphere has served as the de facto security zone of the United States.
In short, the aim of the United States in Europe is to prevent any single European power from exercising control and hegemony over the entire continent, particularly Russia, given that Russia is the largest and most powerful European power. But is it necessary for the United States to intervene in Europe in order to maintain a balance of power against Russia? This is where the isolationist strand of American foreign policy comes into play. The isolationist strand of American foreign policy gains traction based on the logic or rationale that it is not necessary for the United States to intervene in Europe with the aim of maintaining a balance of power between the various European powers.
Thus, the basic choice for the United States in Europe is between “abstention and intervention.” Abstention means avoiding European conflicts, while intervention means being involved in them in order to prevent one European power from dominating all the others. Since World War II, the United States has been deeply concerned about the balance of power in Europe, and the concern reflects in the creation of the European Union (EU) and NATO. What the EU and NATO does is achieve “functional unification” in Europe, even if functional unification does not translate into actual and real unification. The United States considers its involvement in the European balance of power a “vital interest.” As it intervened in order to thwart German hegemony over Europe, the United States continues to intervene in Europe in order to prevent Russian hegemony over Europe. But it is perhaps a foregone conclusion that Russia is in fact the hegemonic power in Europe. Europe alone cannot maintain the European balance of power, and the United States will not be able to maintain the European balance of power on its own forever, which renders Russia the winner in the European balance of power conflict and competition over the long run. As Morgenthau rightly noted, there is a huge discrepancy between the resources allocated by the United States and the resources allocated by Europe to NATO.
There is also the question of whether functional European unification through NATO translates into actual political unity in Europe. The issue of actual political unity amongst Europeans is determined by three factors, as Morgenthau argued. For one, there is the strength of the Eastern bloc. Second, there is the issue of the threat or the nature of the threat emanating from the Eastern bloc. And third, there is the issue of the dynamics and relations within the Western bloc itself. In terms of the strength of the Eastern bloc, the Eastern bloc has gained power over the course of the last few decades. In terms of threat assessment or the nature of the threat emanating from the East, various European nations assess the threat differently. They all have different threat perceptions. And in terms of the dynamics or the relations within the Western bloc itself, the reality is that the Western bloc is divided and in disarray. The political purpose of the Western bloc is far more complex than the military purpose of the Western bloc. Europe is then automatically divided into two halves as a result of the “frozen conflict” imposed on Eastern Europe by Russia. Through “frozen conflict” on the part of Russia, Eastern Europe balks on Western burden-sharing. Europe is essentially “hostages” of Russia to borrow from Morgenthau, given that the United States does not wield an atomic or nuclear monopoly in Europe and as a result of both Russian “frozen conflict” and the discrepancy between American and European resources. Everyone in Europe pays “lip service” to the American strategy of containment, but when it comes to actually contributing to the achievement of NATO goals, no one acts. And if war breaks out in Europe, it will be all-out and nuclear, given the balance of forces between NATO and Russia. Thus, the goal for Europe is avoid conflict with Russia at all costs, which means paying lip service to American containment, but not acting on it.
Adam A. Azim 