All Under Heaven

Our focus shifts to China yet again, given that the restructuring and transformation of world order and thus a “hegemonic transition” such as the one we are experiencing today results from the transfer of the locus of accumulation from one core state to another. That transfer from the United States to China occurred sometime between 2008 and 2009 during the infamous global financial crisis which originated from the United States. 

In turn, the Chinese have always believed that world order was and is “Sinocentric,” even if the tide turned for a certain period of time. To borrow from Henry Kissinger:

“In this view, world order reflected a universal hierarchy, not an equilibrium of competing states. Every known society was conceived of as being in some kind of tributary relationship with China, based in part on its approximation of Chinese culture; none could reach equality with it. Other monarchs were not fellow sovereigns but earnest pupils in the art of governance, striving toward civilization. Diplomacy was not a bargaining process between multiple sovereign interests but a series of carefully contrived ceremonies in which foreign societies were given the opportunity to affirm their assigned placed in the global hierarchy.”

Thus, China views the international system as a “tribute system” whereby the goal of the Chinese is to foster deference from other nations, given China’s place in the world hierarchy. To borrow from Kissinger yet again: “The goal of the tribute system was to foster deference, not to extract economic benefit or to dominate foreign societies militarily.” And in a sense, that is exactly how the international system has been restructured and transformed as of late, namely, as a “tribute system” which puts China at the top of the world hierarchy. 

Nevertheless, the parallel European world order has long sought to transform China into its own image, only to meet resistance from the Chinese. To borrow from Kissinger yet again:

“In the modern era, Western representatives with their own sense of cultural superiority set out to enroll China in the European world system, which was becoming the basic structure of international order. They pressured China to cultivate ties with the rest of the world through exchanges of ambassadors and free trade and to uplift its people through a modernizing economy and a society open to Christian proselytizing.” 

It has long been a tug-of-war of sorts, in the sense that both the West and China seek to absorb the rest of the world and each other into their respective outlooks or views of world order. And that tug-of-war has led to nowhere except a standoff of sorts between the West and China. As Kissinger wrote: “What the West conceived of as a process of enlightenment and engagement was treated in China as an assault. China tried at first to parry it and then to resist outright.” The longstanding reality of international affairs and East-West diplomacy is such that: “China’s acquiescence in the concept of reciprocal diplomacy within a Westphalian system of sovereign states was reluctant and resentful.” 

And the reason for China’s longstanding reluctance and resentment towards partaking in reciprocal diplomacy with European states is because China sees itself as a world order of its own rather than just another ordinary sovereign state in a Eurocentric international system. To borrow from Kissinger yet again: “At the heart of these disputes was a larger question: Was China a world order entire unto itself or a state like others that was part of a wider international system?” For a while, China was compelled to view itself as only one of many ordinary states in a Eurocentric world. And of course, China viewed this role in the Eurocentric world order as an abasement and as “national humiliation.” China’s conception and view of world order “differed markedly from the European experience based on a multiplicity of co-equal states.” In turn, the rise of China as of late “reestablishes historic patterns.” China has emerged as “both the inheritor of an ancient civilization and as a contemporary great power on the Westphalian model.” And to conclude: “It combines the legacies of ‘All Under Heaven,’ technocratic modernization, and an unusually turbulent twentieth-century national quest for a synthesis between the two.”