It follows that on balance, the world system is becoming more Sinocentric and less Eurocentric as a result of the restructuring and transformations which have been occurring in the world system over the course of the last number of years or even decades. To borrow from Kissinger, China’s participation and initial subscription to the Eurocentric world system “carried with it an ambivalence born of the history that brought it to enter into the international state system.” Kissinger added: “China has not forgotten that it was originally forced to engage with the existing international order in a manner utterly at odds with its historical image of itself or, for that matter, with the avowed principles of the Westphalian system.”
And now that it is a full participant in the Eurocentric world system in the sense that it is engaged in international trade and institutions, China seeks to revise the “rules” of the Eurocentric world system as well. China seeks to change the system from within, given its newfound power and status. But this particular reality – namely, China as a participant in a Eurocentric world system – is a reality to which China has never really been accustomed. As Kissinger wrote: “China has believed that it was unique and largely contained within its own reality.” But China has adjusted to international realities nevertheless, and in a very significant way. As Kissinger wrote: “Contemporary Chinese leaders are influenced by their knowledge of China’s history but are not captured by it.”
Also, the pitting of a rising power such as China and a declining power such as the United States leads to the possibility of what political and social science theorists have dubbed as the “Thucydides Trap” whereby the rising power and declining power go to war with one another. And there really is no compromise when one side views the world as being Eurocentric while the other side sees the world as Sinocentric. The grounds for a war between the two sides are fertile. And the challenge becomes one of building a “constructive outcome” out of a situation whereby there can be no compromise. Moreover, American decline – which one should note is a very real phenomenon and occurrence – opens a window for China to assume a greater role in international affairs and in turn undercut American preeminence on the world state to a certain extent.
But the truth of the matter is that neither side, neither the United States nor China, can dominate the whole world all on their own. Both sides are compelled to find “a way of building toward a more peaceful future.” For one, both the United States and China are major actors and powers in Asia. And as a result: “In Asia, [order] must combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership.” Both the United States and China have to balance between partnership and hegemony, or balance between the military component of order and the psychological component of order. China has long insisted that its rise to peer power status with the United States will be peaceful. Moreover, China’s peaceful rise to peer power status with the United States reflects a growing international reality. To conclude: “The world…has grown smaller, and major issues now require an unprecedented degree of global interaction. Global cooperation is, therefore, in China’s self-interest; it is not a strategy for advancing a purely national policy.”
Adam A. Azim 