And as mentioned before, the “Global South” or the “Third World” is where the systemic rivalry between the United States and the Sino-Russian alliance will play out. The key to winning this systemic rivalry is winning over the “Global South” or the “Third World.” But historically, American interventions in the “Global South” or “Third World” have been driven more by capitalism than anything else. “Development” is the key term used as a veil or cover for capitalistic enterprises or interventions in the Third World. To borrow from Odd Arne Westad: “Very often…US involvements were perceived in America as defensive interventions, mainly against left-wing or Communist movements. Still, Washington always remained preoccupied with structural solutions to the Communist challenge, meaning – in the language of the 1950s – development, or becoming more like America.”
“Becoming more like America” meant becoming more capitalistic and consumeristic and materialistic and less cultural and nationalistic and religious. Both during the 20th century Cold War and now, Washington has faced challenges and a general backlash from the East and “Global South.” Europe was and is the priority for American policymakers, and as a result, the United States has largely refrained from conceding to decolonization efforts in the East and Global South so that it would not amount to a loss for Europe. The crucial issue during the 20th century Cold War was “colonial imperialism versus militant nationalism” and it is still the case today. It follows that capitalism and European cultural hegemony were the key objectives or goals to be met in the Third World by America and its European allies or partners.
The Maoist revolution in China which culminated with the overthrow of the Western-backed government in 1949 was the biggest blow to the whole American enterprise in the Third World. Westad argued that “the failed US policy in China had a very negative effect on the domestic policy debate with regard to the Third World.” The “loss of China” became the center of the debate during the early stages of the Cold War in Washington. Moreover, the United States was consistently or constantly faced with the tradeoff of opting for a colonial and imperial strategy vis-à-vis the Third World or accommodating nationalist movements in order to advance its interests. But as Westad argued, the colonial and imperialist option or strategy “hardened considerably” during the Cold War. It follows that the United States “willfully reduced its potential for real alliances with popular nationalist movements.” As a result: “It was this self-inflicted isolation from associations of the more syncretic kind that forced the US to intervene repeatedly in the Third World during the height of the Cold War.”
In short, the United States viewed nationalism and nationalist movements in the Third World as both a “threat” and “a possible prelude to a Communist takeover.” Nationalist revolutions and nationalist movements in general meant that “not only would the free world be deprived of the enormous assets represented by [the Third World], but the Russians would secure these assets” in the words of John Foster Dulles. And if nationalist revolution or nationalist movements succeeded in one locale in the Third World, all of the momentum and energy would catch on and spread throughout the Third World by virtue of what Washington dubbed as a “domino effect” or “domino theory.” As a result, American foreign policy could not and still cannot reconcile itself with nationalist movements and revolution in the Third World, even though the ability of the United States to intervene in the Third World and thwart them has diminished to a large extent.
Adam A. Azim 