Nationalistic Universalism

We can infer, then, that in reality, all of it is a matter of psychoanalysis. But of course, the global economy is now the structure within which we seek to find our personal happiness and satisfaction. That is in essence the big picture, if not the whole picture. How nationalistic and religious fervor comes into the picture then becomes apparent and evident to a certain degree and extent. 

It is no wonder, therefore, that a denial of the centrality of psychoanalysis in the bigger picture translates into the denial of basic and general morality on the international scene. In short, and in sum: “The supranational forces, such as universal religions, humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and all the other personal ties, institutions, and organizations that bind individuals together across national boundaries, are infinitely weaker today than the forces that unite peoples within a particular national boundary and separate them from the rest of humanity.” 

Here is where nationalism fills the void, namely, the void left behind from the failure of supranationalism or internationalism and liberalism. Moreover, and as Morgenthau noted, there is also a distinction to be made between plain nationalism on one hand and “nationalistic universalism” on the other hand. Morgenthau wrote: “While nationalism wants one nation in one state and nothing else, the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all the other nations.”

Arguably, the two nations who are most guilty of “nationalistic universalism” in recent times are the United States and Russia. To a certain extent, nationalistic universalism has become the religion of our time, replacing any cosmopolitan or universalist notions of religion virtually everywhere. It is no wonder that in the United States, nationalists such as “MAGA” and Christian fundamentalists have essentially joined forces. Nationalistic universalism and who takes up its mantle “may shift from nation to nation according to the conditions of spirit and power.” 

Globalization and perhaps modernity in general are also accompanied by cultural decay and decline, and out of cultural decay and decline arises nationalistic and religious fervor. And through nationalistic and religious fervor, the lonely individual becomes part of something bigger. In other words, the lonely individual finds his or her purpose, and it is a sense of purpose which is lacking as a result of modernity having reached its peak. Nationalism and religion are therefore rooted in globalization and modernity, as Fukuyama argued. Arguably, this sense of purpose which underlies nationalistic and religious fervor is what makes nationalism and nationalistic universalism the most powerful force on the international scene.

Even the bourgeoisie succumbs to nationalistic and religious fervor, as Arendt argued and highlighted. Hence, we cannot underestimate the consequences and implications which result from the general transition out of village communities to an urban society which assumes a global scale and scope as a result of capitalism and technology. Traditional and small town people and village dwellers all over the world come face to face with “a pluralistic world with very different ways of life in which their traditional norms are not respected.” 

The question, then, becomes one of finding a sense of belonging or basic identity out of the psychological dislocation and displacement resulting from capitalism and technology. This question arises everywhere, and is not confined or limited to just one region such as the West. Radicalization results from alienation, as Fukuyama argued, both from an individual’s local community and the forces of globalization which are at play. It follows that the motives behind nationalistic and religious fervor “are more personal and psychological than religious and reflects the acute problem of identity that certain individuals face.” 

In a sense, all individuals, regardless of race and religion, are caught between two cultures, namely, liberal culture and their national identity. And the alienation from both liberal culture and national identity as a result of globalization and technology results in frustration and thus radicalization, as Fukuyama argued. And as mentioned before, the identity crisis which results from modernity leads to the rise of nationalism. Both nationalistic and religious fervor “appeared on the world stage at moments of social transition from traditional isolated agrarian societies to modern ones connected to a broader and more diverse world.” And perhaps at the heart of nationalistic and religious fervor is a demand for recognition from others. It is all about recognition in the end. But a demand for recognition only for oneself, not for others.