Calculated Aggression

In essence, and from a big picture perspective or big picture standpoint, the core concept or the main concept to nail down is the difference between ‘absolute power’ and ‘relative power.’ Aspirations always exceed capabilities, given that power is not absolute, but rather, relative. Power is distributed. But of course, states will always seek to change the distribution of power in their favor. As Mearsheimer wrote: “Let there be an opportunity for those weaker states to revise the balance in their own favor…and they will take advantage of it.” 

Also, there is always a fine balance between offense and defense. It follows that “great powers are not mindless aggressors so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories.” Mearsheimer added:

“On the contrary, before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment. Nor do states start arms races that are unlikely to improve their overall position.” 

A state “has to know its limitations to survive in the international system.” But given the aforementioned, we can no longer assume that Russia’s assault on Ukraine or China’s plans to seize Taiwan are “reckless.” Rather, they are calculated. There is also a reason for why the next nine states after the United States combined spend less on defense than the United States. States will limit defense spending “either because spending more would bring no strategic advantage or because spending more would weaken the economy and undermine the state’s power in the long run.” 

In other words, states have to come up with “calculated aggression” rather than unbounded aggression. Information is also key. The better the quality of the information and knowledge given to elite decision-makers, the better the choices and decisions they will make. “Tora Bora” and “Yellow Cake” and neocons led to today’s situation. States also have to employ deception from time to time. Weak states will act strong in order to deter others, while strong states will be coy and hide their true aims so that others are left vulnerable to their attacks in the future, as in the case of China. But no one knows how war will play out either. Important decisions about foreign policy and war are always made with “incomplete information.” 

War, however, is mostly about defense. A defensive approach or stance to foreign policy strategy and war compensates for incomplete information. Efforts at hegemony are always met with a group of countries banding together to counter the efforts, as was the case in the 21st century with the United States and in the 20th century with Nazi Germany. As one military strategist argued, war can be summed up as defense that builds up and endures to the point of a surprise attack which ends the war. Going forward, the United States has to be “content” with the current configuration of the global balance or distribution of power and not change it by coercion and force. At this point in time, it is all about preserving the current global balance or distribution of power rather than changing it by coercion and force. According to one particular school of thought in international relations, namely, the “defensive realism” school of international relations: 

“In a world where conquest seldom pays, states should have relatively benign intentions towards each other. If they do not…the reason is probably poisonous domestic politics, not smart calculations about how to guarantee one’s security in an anarchic world.” 

Well said.