One should perhaps be mindful that the basic paradigm of big power and small country relations constitutes the system itself. When a small country decides to step out of the basic paradigm, it translates into a challenge to the system as a whole. And while difficult at first, the strategy of stepping out of the paradigm and challenging the system ends up being quite successful, as evinced by the case we are analyzing at the moment, namely, Iran.
And in terms of Iran, the core issue is not its nuclear program, as we mentioned before. There is a deeper issue involved, which Kissinger highlighted in the following terms: “Though couched in terms of technical and scientific capabilities, the issue is at heart about international order – about the ability of the international community to enforce its demands against sophisticated forms of rejection, the permeability of the global nonproliferation regime, and the prospects for a nuclear arms race in the world’s most volatile region.”
But most importantly, Iran’s nuclear program changes the overall balance of power in the Middle East, and it is the balance of power which is most important. Nuclear weapons change the balance of power more dramatically than anything else, given that the balance of power is determined first and foremost by “military and industrial capacity.” And as Kissinger argued: “The record shows steadily advancing Iranian nuclear capabilities taking place while the Western position has progressively softened.”
Moreover, Iran has employed its nuclear program as one part of a “spectrum” of capabilities aimed at a particular goal. To borrow from Kissinger yet again:
“In Iran, the nuclear issue was treated as one aspect of a general struggle over regional order and ideological supremacy, fought in a range of arenas and territories with methods spanning the spectrum of war and peace – military and paramilitary operations, diplomacy, formal negotiation, propaganda, political subversion – in fluid and mutually reinforcing combination. In this context, the quest for an agreement must contend with the prospect that Tehran will be at least exploring a strategy of relaxing tensions just enough to break the sanctions regime but retaining a substantial nuclear infrastructure and a maximum freedom of action to turn it into a weapons program later.”
The focal point for the standoff between Iran and the West is not nuclear weapons. Rather, the standoff emerges out of “different perceptions of world order.” Yet, it is the nuclear issue which will set off a transformation in the overall relations between Iran and the West. But regardless of the outcomes in its nuclear negotiations, Iran has acquired “prestige” for having resisted the sanctions regime of a major power. To borrow from Kissinger:
“Iran has brought exceptional skill and consistency to bear on its proclaimed goal of undermining the Middle East state system and ejecting Western influence from the region. Whether Iran were to build and test a nuclear weapon in the near term or ‘merely’ retain the capability to do so within months of choosing to do so, the implications on regional and global order will be comparable. Even if Iran were to stop at a virtual nuclear weapons capability, it will be seen to have achieved this level in defiance of the most comprehensive international sanctions ever imposed on any country. The temptations of Iran’s geostrategic rivals – such as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – to develop or purchase their own nuclear programs to match the Iranian capability will become irresistible. The risk of an Israeli preemptive attack would rise significantly. As for Iran, having withstood sanctions in developing a nuclear weapons capability, it will gain prestige, new powers of intimidation, and enhanced capacity to act with conventional weapons or non-nuclear forms of unconventional war.”
In a sense, for the Iranians, the goal has been accomplished simply by retaining the nuclear knowledge which can never really be taken away, all while boldly defying the West and resisting its dominance and hegemony and primacy in the region.
Adam A. Azim 