Second Note to “Détente and its Discontents”

After Kissinger’s détente, Carter and Reagan decided to “turn the table” on Moscow in Afghanistan. And guess what? It worked. And of course, the whole idea recently was to apply the same concept in Ukraine, in the sense that perhaps one can “turn the table” on Moscow in Ukraine the way one was able to “turn the table” on Moscow in Afghanistan in the 1980’s. But of course, it doesn’t seem to work in Ukraine today. We cannot “turn the table” on Moscow today in Ukraine in the manner by which we were able to “turn the table” on Moscow in Afghanistan in the 1980’s. And of course, the question is why. And the answer is the mysterious and unexplainable balance of power. In Afghanistan in the 1980’s, the balance of power favored Washington. Today, in Ukraine, the balance of power favors Moscow. Thus, between détente on one hand and “turn the table” on Moscow on the other hand, it appears as though the current administration in the White House deems détente as the better course of action. And of course, if Moscow decides to overreach after today’s détente in the manner by which it overreached after Kissinger’s détente in Afghanistan, you might be able to “turn the table” on Moscow. The key word is might. But unfortunately, to “turn the table” on Moscow today in Ukraine has perhaps exhausted its course and its shelf life. I don’t think it can happen.