War in Europe eclipses and overshadows all other considerations and priorities at the moment, for perhaps two major reasons. One is that Donald Trump got elected to end the war. And two, the dynamics and the nature of the war in Europe are what necessitate the focus that the war is now getting, in the sense that there is no “intermediate point” between peace and total war when it comes to the conflict or war with Russia, as the foremost experts on the Cold War have stated in the past. As a result, if peace is excluded from the picture as is the case currently, it follows that every move on the part of Russia is a step towards the destruction of the other side. And in turn, each step that Russia takes in its war is never perceived by the United States as a justification for war with Russia, which then suggests yet again that neither the United States nor Russia perceive of an “intermediate point” by which either one of them ends their pursuit of gambits and moves. It all very much amounts to a ‘slippery slope’ which descends into the annihilation of the other side. Henry Kissinger wrote:
“In the face of the methodical, almost imperceptible advances of the Kremlin, subtly adjusted so that no one of its individual steps seems ‘worth’ an all-out war, it has become even more apparent that the willingness to resist aggression depends importantly on the price that must be paid. We may wait a long time for that ‘pure’ case of aggression in which our military doctrine, the provocation, and our principles are all in harmony.”
Holding off on military action vis-à-vis Russia on the part of the United States is supported by separation from Russia by an entire continent and an entire ocean. But of course, the sense of “invulnerability” has been shattered by the advent of nuclear weapons and highly advanced technology. As a result, in terms of both the policy and strategy vis-à-vis Russia, the United States is very much in a “defensive” position. Kissinger wrote: “The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile has merely brought the physical equation into line with the psychological one; it has increased our reluctance to engage in war even more.”
Arguably, whichever side initiates war “in less than all-out form” – which in this case is Russia – has the advantage and the upper hand. And as we mentioned before, every step that is taken once the war is initiated is a step towards the “ultimate destruction” of the other side, given the lack of “intermediate points” between peace and total war. To borrow from Kissinger yet again:
“It can be argued that the fear of all-out war is bound to be mutual, that the Soviet leaders will, therefore, share our reluctance to engage in any adventures which may involve this risk. But though each side may be equally deterred from engaging in all-out war, it makes all the difference which side can extricate itself from its dilemma only by initiating such a struggle. If the Soviet bloc can present its challenges in less than all-out form, it may gain a crucial advantage. Every move on its part will then pose the appalling dilemma of whether we are willing to commit suicide to prevent encroachments, no one of which seems to threaten our existence directly but which may be a step on the road to our ultimate destruction.”
In short, the balance between Washington and Moscow in terms of nuclear weapons and technology is what places Washington on the backpedal and Moscow on the offensive, to the point where it poses a direct threat to the United States itself, let alone Europe. And that balance between Washington and Moscow still very much exists today. Moreover, the balance tilts ever more to the advantage of Russia as a result of increasing pressure by Russia. The more pressure that Russia applies, the more the balance tilts to Russia’s favor. Kissinger wrote:
“The growing Soviet nuclear stockpile, coupled with the diversification of nuclear technology, places precisely this possibility in the hands of the Soviet leadership. It can engage in military actions ranging from the employment of conventional forces to the use of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons of a size which will raise serious doubt as to whether they ‘warrant’ the resort to all-out war. Every Soviet move of this nature will provide us with an incentive to defer a showdown to a more propitious moment or to a clearer provocation. An all-or-nothing military policy will, therefore, play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which combines political, psychological, and military pressures to induce the greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation in the minds of the opponent.”
Thus, and ironically, the fact that there is no alternative or option for the United States other than defensive backpedaling on one hand and all-out war with Russia on the other hand negates any war with Russia, which in turn enables the Russian strategy of maximum pressure. Moreover, yet another danger arises from this conundrum or dilemma, which is that Washington now very much relies on the “peaceful intent” of Russia rather than its own capabilities and defenses in order to get out of this dilemma. And arguably, it is an intent which Russia will never espouse. There is inevitably a price to pay for peace with Russia – and that is if peace is ever struck – but no one knows exactly what that price will be.
Adam A. Azim 