Conventional Deterrence

It follows that if détente and peaceful coexistence never lasts, the focus and the strategy by default becomes one of “containment” and “deterrence” vis-à-vis Russian aggression and expansion. In turn, one can bank on a policy or strategy of deterrence only if the opposite side espouses “fear of the consequences” of aggression and expansion. As John Mearsheimer wrote:

“A potential attacker’s fear of the consequences of military action lies at the heart of deterrence. Specifically, deterrence – a function of the costs and risks associated with military action – is most likely to obtain when an attacker believes that his probability of success is low and that the attendant costs will be high.”

In short, deterrence is a matter of instilling fear and imposing a serious cost-benefit analysis. Is the cost of aggression and expansion higher, or the benefit of it? And as Mearsheimer argued: “History clearly demonstrates that decision makers are willing, under the right circumstances, to accept the costs associated with conventional war.”

Mearsheimer also highlighted the fact that whereas nuclear war inflicts costs in a very short period of time, conventional war is protracted, which means the aggressor and the expansionist power will “adjust to increasing losses.” Balance of forces, whether one is better off on offense or on defense, weaponry, goals and objectives, as well as the time it takes to achieve goals and objectives all factor into the decision of whether to wage war or not. But as Mearsheimer suggested, an attacker or aggressor has three strategies to choose from. One is the “attrition” strategy as opposed to the “blitzkreig” strategy. And of course, the strategy always ties into the ultimate goal in mind. As Mearsheimer wrote:

“When the goal is to defeat the opponent decisively, an attacker can choose between the attrition and blitzkrieg strategies. With the attrition strategy, the attacker seeks to defeat his opponent by engaging in numerous battles of annihilation, or set-piece battles. Ultimate success depends on wearing the defense down until resistance is no longer possible. The blitzkrieg, on the other hand, relies on the mobility and speed inherent in an armored force to defeat an opponent decisively without a series of bloody battles.”

And as we said, there is also a third strategy which the attacker or aggressor can adopt, namely, the “limited aims” strategy whereby the aim is “seizing a slice of the opponent’s territory.” The “ideal” strategy for the attacker is the “limited aims” strategy, whereas for the defense, the ideal strategy is attrition. But in any case, the attacker seeks “direct annihilation” of the opposing force, but through “overwhelming a stubborn defense in a series of bloody set-piece battles.”

And while the weaponry in war has changed, the strategies have not. Arguably, in Ukraine, the best strategy for the defense and its allies is an “attrition” strategy, given that Ukrainian forces would not stand a chance if Russia were to adopt a “blitzkrieg” strategy. Whether the “ideal” strategy for Russia is a “limited aims” strategy whereby Russia will just settle for a slice of Ukrainian territory will be evinced by how the current peace negotiations go with the Trump Administration. Whether the “blitzkrieg” strategy evolved into an “attrition” strategy in Ukraine is a question which historians might have to assess in the future. Nevertheless, the more important question is how NATO and Russian forces size up in either an “attrition” or “blitzkrieg” situation. To borrow from Mearsheimer:

“It is apparent that whether or not a blitzkrieg succeeds depends on more than the capabilities of the attacker. Simply having the organizational structure and the trained forces for a blitzkrieg is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success. The defender’s skills as well as the terrain significantly affect the final outcome. A skillful defender can thwart a blitzkrieg; this strategy is not a foolproof means for achieving a rapid and decisive victory on the battlefield. Certainly the Soviets would have to consider the matter should they contemplate an attack against NATO. Although the Soviets might believe that their forces are organized and trained to implement a blitzkrieg, they would be fighting against NATO forces trained for an armored battlefield, and it might simply not be possible for such a Soviet strategy to succeed. The question both parties face is: will a Soviet attack resemble the German blitzkrieg of May 1940 or the fighting on the eastern front? The answer to that question will depend as much upon NATO as upon the Soviets.”

Thus, the more important question is how NATO forces size up in either one of these two war scenarios and not necessarily the question of how Russian forces size up in such scenarios, given that NATO is very much in a defensive position and is the one who seeks to deter Russia, whereas Russia is the attacker and the aggressor who is on offense. And of course, war is merely an “instrument” for the achievement of a political goal, which arguably is “direct annihilation” of the opposing side. In sum, deterrence “is ultimately a function of the relationship between military calculations and the political considerations that drive a nation to consider war.”