The danger and risk in Washington at the present moment is very much over-expansion on one hand and under-balancing against the Russian threat on the other hand. Moreover, we can go as far back as the Soviet era to understand what Russian objectives and strategies are. Russian strategy possesses “a continuity and a coherence all too often missing in the West” as Condoleezza Rice once wrote. The Russian point of view holds that: “The ‘international system’ was not the guardian of [Russian] interests, it was a threat to them.”
It follows that “any cooperation with the West had to be tactical; integration into the international system was suicidal, as this would bring about dependence upon those whose primary goal was the destruction of socialism.” Moreover, Russian strategy is very much a “third world strategy” which “allowed the Soviets to extend their power as cheaply as possible, picking up crumbs of support where Western policies had failed.”
All along, Moscow sought to turn its isolation from the Eurocentric global order into a strength rather than a weakness through military and technological prowess. In turn, Washington contended that Russian strategy “cannot survive long unless perestroika [openness to the West] gives [Russia] the economic clout to make it a success.” The question is, who is right and who is wrong? Is Washington correct in suggesting that an overemphasis on military and technological prowess on the part of Moscow is a flaw rather than a strength? Or is Moscow correct in suggesting that isolation from the Eurocentric global order is vital and in turn military and technological prowess trumps excess wealth?
Westernize? Or hold steady to the belief that Russia has “special advantages” which would then enable Russia to “stick to its guns” per se? What one could perhaps exploit is the grave discrepancy in terms of wealth between the Russian rank and file on one hand and the oligarchs on the other hand. But of course, Russia can exploit that weakness in the West as well. The Russian perspective or standpoint is such that there is simply no way around “the preparation of the whole country for war.” Condoleezza Rice wrote:
“The greatest legacy bequeathed to modern Soviet strategists…is the concept of the preparation of the whole society for continuous struggle. The inevitability of war was dropped as a tenet of Soviet political doctrine in 1956. It has been replaced by the concept of ‘peaceful competition and coexistence’ with the hostile capitalist camp and the expectation that socialism will, in the long term, win. Since the Soviets accept that there would be ‘no winners’ in a nuclear war (though they would try to survive it), they now believe that only a fatal mistake by the socialist world – perhaps leading to global annihilation – will abort the final communist victory. But the Soviets do not believe that the fundamental hostility of the capitalist world to socialism has been undone by the nuclear age. Consequently, the preparation of the country for war, even if it is to be avoided, is essential. The Soviets are locked into the hostile relationship for the long term.”
Russia sees itself ultimately as a bulwark and a deterrent against Western “adventurism” in the Eastern world and the Third World. And if there is a core assumption or underlying premise to Russian ideology and thought, it is very much “the concept of continuous struggle and extraordinary vigilance.” Rice added: “Reliance on the military power of the state, acquired at great cost and organized like that of military powers of the past, was handed down to the Soviets by historical experience. It is this experience that gives the Soviet version of permanent struggle a decidedly martial ring.”
In sum, experience shows us that inevitable and perpetual conflict and war between East and West has determined and shaped Russia’s relationship with the Western world, and as a result, there is no reason to perceive or to suggest otherwise. If we can infer from historical experience inevitable and perpetual conflict and war as the core or the nucleus of the overall relationship between East and West, what would make one assume or think that somehow, everything can just magically and suddenly change overnight and in an instant?
Adam A. Azim 