Thus, if there is any “grand strategy” to be had on the part of Washington despite its relative isolation and withdrawal from Eurasian affairs, it would be the same as before and it is a long-standing one, namely, a strategy of “containment” vis-à-vis Russia and the establishment of a basic power equilibrium and order in Europe. Liddell Hart gave a dictionary definition of “grand strategy” in the following terms: “The object in war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”
In turn, the peace that is sought through prolonged war with the aim of absolute victory contains “the germs of another war.” In essence, there is a directionality to war that consists of a “mental process.” The more directionality to the war, the less it costs to wage the war, given that the directionality adheres to or facilitates this “mental process.”
But quite interestingly, Liddell Hart was interested less in the strategies of war than he was with the lessons of history. He wrote: “The experience of history brings ample evidence that the downfall of civilized states tends to come not from the direct assaults of foes but from internal decay, combined with the consequences of exhaustion in war.”
Liddell Hart also distinguished “aggressive” and “predatory” states such as Russia from other ones, and in terms of dealing with such states, Liddell Hart suggested that even if it is difficult or perhaps impossible to make peace with such states, the easier route would be “to induce them into a state of truce” given the “mirage of victory” which can only be pursued to the point of exhaustion. How to “induce” Russia into such a state is subject to debate and discussion. Nevertheless, and theoretically, a cessation of hostilities would be better than the intensification of them. Liddell Hart wrote: “For the spirit of barbarism can be weakened only during a cessation of hostilities; war strengthens it – pouring fuel on the flames.”
John Lewis Gaddis argued that at the heart of “grand strategy” is the concept or principle of “proportionality” – with “proportionality” defined as “the alignment of potentially infinite aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.” Moreover, what may be lost on us is both the morality and the utility of “bending the alignment toward freedom.” After all, there can be no freedom in a state of total war. And as a result, freedom becomes the ultimate goal of “grand strategy” through the ultimate balancing of ends with means.
Nevertheless, all of the aforementioned revolves around the question of how to deal with Russia. When it comes to a broader “grand strategy” or even the narrower “strategy” in terms of war planning and war objectives, all of it revolves around the question of how to deal with Russia. War ultimately has to tie itself to an end, and that end is Russia. And as one scholar wrote in terms of how the end has to be both clear and legitimate: “Indeed, the history of war and diplomacy, which makes up such a large part of history in general, is little more than the record of the readiness or refusal of nations to base their policies upon that truth.”
Adam A. Azim 