Twenty-Eighth Note to “Essence of Guerrilla Warfare”

In other words, if we are not committed to the goal in Europe or Britain because of the degree of importance we have placed on the goal there, what makes anywhere else important enough that we are then committed to the goal anywhere else? What makes anywhere else more important than Europe and Britain which would then ensure that we not balk on our commitment there even if we balk on our commitment to Europe and Britain given that Europe and Britain aren’t important enough? It follows that what we deem as important enough is both the decisive factor and the overriding factor in the overall conflict and war with Moscow. We can “deter” Moscow with bases and troops in Europe and Britain, but we can also “compel” Moscow to get out of the way as we tried in Ukraine in 2014. But if “compellence” backfires as is the case now, then the whole containment and deterrence project becomes a disastrous failure as well. Thus, there is an inherent logic in the conflict and war which needs to be studied and understood but was overlooked and ignored for decades now. And if the logic is flawed, the outcomes are flawed as well.