Twenty-Ninth Note to “Essence of Guerrilla Warfare”

The whole point is to deter Moscow, but one can compel Moscow as well. But as Schelling argued, if one compels, there must be a connection between the act or the threat of “compellence” on one hand and the demand made or the result or outcome that is sought to be achieved or rendered through the act of “compellence” on the other hand.

For instance, in Ukraine in 2014, we compelled Russia to fight in Ukraine. But what was the result or outcome that we sought or what was the demand we were making of the Russians through our act of “compellence” towards them? The answer was that the demand, result, and outcome were far from clear, and when the demand, result, and outcome are far from clear, the act of compellence increases the risk of a disaster. And while the focus was perhaps to manipulate the risk of a disaster in Ukraine, a disaster was not intended. Hence, the notion of keeping a “limited war” limited and not allowing a “limited war” to spiral into a total war in Europe. But what we got was a disaster nonetheless. What we got was the increased risk of total war in Europe. Hence, the inherent logic and reasoning of the conflict and war is essential and key. Without the logic and reasoning, all is lost.