Twenty-Sixth Note to “Essence of Guerrilla Warfare”

And when it comes to the all-important matter of goals and strategies in conflict and war, it all comes down to “containment” and “deterrence” vis-à-vis Moscow. But as Schelling argued, the goal or the strategy is credible only if Moscow thinks it is credible. If Moscow does not think the goal or the strategy is credible, then Moscow will not act or behave as though the United States is a credible interlocutor or adversary. Moreover, the credibility of the goal and strategy stems from the commitment to the goal and strategy. And in terms of commitment, it is not “all or nothing.” Rather, commitment comes in “degrees” whereby we are put in a position to attach “degrees” of importance to certain places and in turn the degree of importance we attach to places determines our commitment to those places. It follows that if Washington places a low degree of importance on Europe or even Britain, it indicates the degree of commitment there, and that degree of commitment in turn determines whether the threat of containment or deterrence is credible or not. And of course, all of this then impacts and shapes the actions and the behavior of everyone involved, but first and foremost the actions and the behavior of Moscow.