Eighth Note to “The Making of Russian Strategy”

In essence, conflict and war amount to the agglomeration of moral, intellectual and psychological forces which then concentrate or converge at a “decisive point” and is then aimed at the “dislocation” or “dissolution” of the enemy. In turn, strategy and tactics are the instruments or the means of achieving that ultimate aim. Arguably, we need … Continue reading Eighth Note to “The Making of Russian Strategy” →

Conventional Deterrence

It follows that if détente and peaceful coexistence never lasts, the focus and the strategy by default becomes one of “containment” and “deterrence” vis-à-vis Russian aggression and expansion. In turn, one can bank on a policy or strategy of deterrence only if the opposite side espouses “fear of the consequences” of aggression and expansion. As … Continue reading Conventional Deterrence →

The Problems of Limited War

Everything began with Washington’s limited wars, and in the end, everything will revolve around them as well. And what followed is a failure of “deterrence,” with deterrence amounting to stopping others from doing what they wish to do. Washington's core objective for decades has been to stop others from doing what they want to do. … Continue reading The Problems of Limited War →